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ABSTRACT 
 
A methodology for the implementation of Zippo, a 
patternless intrusion detection system is presented in this 
thesis.  This methodology approaches the implementation in 
a holistic manner to include the administrative and 
operational tasks necessary for ensuring proper preparation 
for Zippo’s use.  Prior to implementing and using Zippo, a 
basic understanding of TCP/IP and intrusion detection 
systems is needed and these topics are presented in broad 
detail.  The origin of Zippo starts with the creation of 
Therminator, which is discussed in detail.  The 
architecture and configuration of Zippo are based on those 
of Therminator and understanding the ideas of buckets and 
balls, thermal canyons and towers, decision trees, 
slidelength and windowlength and initial and boundary 
conditions are paramount to understanding the Zippo 
application.  To successfully implement Zippo, other 
network factors must be attended to including the topology, 
organizational policies and the security plan.  Once these 
factors are addressed, Zippo can be optimally configured to 
successfully be installed on a network.  Finally, previous 
research done on Zippo yielded decision trees and thermal 
canyons pertaining to protocol specific threats that are 
presented to familiarize the reader with Zippo’s visual 
representation of malicious or anomalous behavior. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. COMPUTER NETWORK DEFENSE  
In today’s network-centric society, with the 
prevalence of e-business and electronic communications, the 
quest for secure networks has been brought to the front 
lines of the technology battlefield.  Networks are found in 
every facet of daily life.  The world’s financial 
investment market relies on networks.  The backbone of 
global communications and transportation is a network.  
Networks form the infrastructure of the world’s largest 
organizations to the smallest “mom and pop” businesses.     
With the proliferation of networks comes the 
proliferation of exploitation.  As the number of networks 
rise, so does the number of malicious hackers trying to 
“illegally” gain access to the systems to carryout such 
behavior as reconnaissance, exploitation, reinforcement to 
elevate privileges, consolidation to communicate 
undetectably with the system and pillaging [BEJT-05].  This 
means that system administrators have an ever increasing 
need to ensure security of their networks and safety of 
their data.  In much the same way a military must develop a 
strategy to defend its assets and its perimeter, so too 
must system administrators develop a strategy to defend the 
boundaries of their networks.  Network defense in depth is 
a term that has been adopted to address this issue.   
A good defense in depth contains numerous security 
programs and procedures to address malicious behavior and 
misuse of a network system.  Physical security as well as 
network security should be addressed for the proper defense 
of a system.  Applying only one defensive measure to a 
2 
computer network would be analogous to the little Dutch boy 
being able to plug only one hole in the dike, allowing 
water to breach all other entrances, thereby destroying it.  
Defense in depth requires a thorough security plan that 
addresses all facets of computer network security to 
include the perimeter, the internal system and the humans 
in the loop.   
There are hundreds of products available in the 
commercial market to aid in thwarting network attacks.  
Networks can use proxy servers to “hide” real servers that 
service an organization.  Firewalls can be configured to 
allow traffic from defined sets of IP addresses and 
disallow traffic from others.  Another tool available to 
support a strong defense in depth posture is a patternless 
intrusion detection system.  
  
B. PATTERNLESS INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS (PIDS) 
Intrusion detection systems (IDS) provide a fairly 
robust computer defense mechanism that searches incoming 
traffic for defined signatures or aberrant behavior.  There 
are numerous types of IDS on the market today.  Signature-
based, anomaly, host- or network-based systems make up the 
majority of commercial IDS available.  Patternless 
intrusion detection systems, or PIDS, are the newest 
technologies on the block.  PIDS provide visibility into 
the traffic that exists on a network, giving system 
administrators another tool to monitor not only the health 
of their network but also the effectiveness of the other 
network defense systems they are using.  
In a PIDS, the program relies on neither signatures of 
known malicious activity nor human behavior models to seek 
3 
out anomalous behavior: instead, it bases its 
interpretation of network behavior on a statistical 
analysis of network traffic and knowledge of network 
policy.  The traffic is modeled and available for reviewing 
or viewing in real-time by the system administrator.  An 
example of a PIDS is the Therminator program created by 
Stephen Donald and Robert McMillen in conjunction with Dr. 
David Ford, the Naval Postgraduate School and the National 
Security Agency [DONA-01]. 
 
1. Therminator 
The Therminator is a network-based PIDS that relies on 
the principles of thermodynamic statistics to model network 
traffic.  It uses categories and conversations as the 
underlying base of the network model.  A real-time 3-
dimensional model of a network’s traffic is created by the 
program and displayed in a graphical user interface (GUI) 
that is easy for the administrator to view and interpret.  
A further discussion on the evolution of Therminator will 
be presented in Chapter IV. 
 
2. Zippo 
Subsequent to the development of Therminator was the 
creation of Zippo. The Therminator program was not created 
as a final system to be used for long-term installation or 
for demonstration tasks [ZACH-04].  Zippo was created to 
address these short-comings of Therminator.   
Dr. John Zachary and his team at the University of 
South Carolina were contracted to develop Zippo as a more 
robust software implementation of the Therminator model.  
Zippo primarily addresses the need for longer execution 
4 
times, higher traffic volume and faster processing and the 
ability to be used across numerous types of platforms and 
network configurations [ZACH-04].  A further description of 
Zippo will be presented in Chapter V. 
 
3. Network Thermal Vistas 
Network Thermal Vistas (NTV) is an innovative and 
robust patternless intrusion detection system developed by 
Secure Cognition, Inc. Network Thermal Vistas uses the 
patented Therminator technology, licensed from the National 
Security Agency, to provide a commercially available 
version of the Therminator application that has been 
improved to be more scalable and, like Therminator and 
Zippo, provides an intuitive 3-dimensional display that 
shows real-time network state changes.  With NTV, Secure 
Cognition Inc. has successfully marketed the Therminator 
technology, which has been readily adopted by the 
entertainment industry, and continues to add to the 
system’s successes and prove that the Patternless Intrusion 
Detection concept adds an original layer to a network’s 
defense in depth [SECCOG-04].  
 
C. THESIS MOTIVATION 
Network administrators are given the weighty task of 
defending their organizations’ networks against malicious 
activity and even activity caused unknowingly by trusted 
users (e.g. Trojan horses installed accidentally by 
installation of a useful program).  This is a very 
substantial task considering a system administrator is 
responsible for finding all the holes in his network and a 
malicious hacker need only find one.  One of the tools that 
5 
can greatly enhance a system administrator’s ability to 
safeguard their network is the Zippo patternless intrusion 
detection system.   
 The purpose of this thesis is to develop a 
methodology for implementing Zippo on any given network.  
The methodology will encompass the steps necessary to 
properly use Zippo as well as assets that need to already 
be in place prior to implementing Zippo.  Additionally, the 
first section of this thesis cursorily examines the 
protocols that are used in network communications so the 
reader understands how an IDS works prior to employing one.  
During the research phase of this thesis, the author 
worked with an organization already using Therminator.  The 
network experts assigned to the organization were 
interviewed in great depth and the implementation 
methodology created by the author is heavily influenced by 
the work done with these individuals and their network.  
Because of confidentiality and security concerns, the 
actual organization, its members and their network of 
interest cannot be identified. 
  The ultimate motivation behind this thesis is to create a 
methodology for an organization to take the next step in 
patternless intrusion detection and implement Zippo on 
their network systems.  It is the author’s intent that 
after reading this thesis the reader will have the 
necessary knowledge to be able to adequately understand 
what an IDS is, how it works, what assets need to be in 
place prior to the implementation of the IDS, how to 
properly configure Zippo and how to properly 
monitor/translate the visual display Zippo presents.  This 
thesis is not the panacea to computer security in the same 
6 
manner that one simple IDS is not the panacea to defense in 
depth; it is merely a tool that provides the reader with 
one more level of security to properly safeguard important 
data against malfeasants.  
  
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The next four chapters of this thesis develop the 
foundation for understanding what an IDS is and how it 
works.  Chapter II is a brief introduction (or review for 
some) of Transmission Control Protocol and Internet 
Protocol (TCP/IP).  Chapter III will discuss what an IDS is 
and the different types of IDS available.  Chapter IV is an 
in-depth look at the Therminator IDS, as the author feels 
it is very important to understand how a system works prior 
to using it.  Chapter V concludes the introductory section 
with a description of Zippo, its evolution and its 
capabilities. 
Chapters VI – VIII present the assets that should be 
in place prior to implementing Zippo.  These include a 
network topology with defined services and system 
inventory, the organizational policies and procedures with 
regard to such topics as accessibility, usage, training, 
etc., and lastly an organization’s security plan.  These 
chapters will present what the author thinks is the 
preferred architecture for policies and plans and provide 
guidance on developing them and on developing a network 
topology. 
Chapters IX and X deal specifically with the Zippo 
PIDS.  These chapters will outline for the reader an 
approach to configuring Zippo for a specific network based 
on previous research conducted at the Naval Postgraduate 
7 
School and will look at the process of monitoring Zippo 
during implementation. 
Lastly, Chapter XI will provide a summary of the steps 
introduced throughout the thesis and will discuss useful 
areas of future research. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
With the increase in size and reach of the Internet, 
and as more and more businesses and organizations have come 
to rely on networking, so too has the number of malicious 
users increased.  It is much easier for a hacker to gain 
access to a network through one small hole, than it is for 
a system administrator to protect a network with lots of 
holes.  Instituting a defense in depth, using numerous 
methodologies, tools, policies and physical security layers 
aids a system administrator in protecting their network.   
An Intrusion Detection System (IDS) is one layer in a 
defense in depth to protect a network against malicious 
behavior.  In the recent past, a Patternless Intrusion 
Detection System was developed at the Naval Postgraduate 
School to be used as a part of a defense in depth.  
Therminator, as this tool is called, is just the beginning 
of numerous generations of PIDS to include the topic of 
this thesis, Zippo.   
In this thesis, basic IDS will be discussed along with 
the foundation for understanding how Zippo works (i.e. 
TCP/IP).  Additionally, this thesis will set out a 
methodology that any system administrator can follow for 
implementing Zippo on their own network.  Lastly, this 
thesis will discuss the optimal way of configuring Zippo 
and how to interpret the feedback received from Zippo. 
8 
As stated before, Zippo is not a tool that can 
effectively protect an entire network on its own.  It must 
be used in conjunction with other elements of computer 
network defense to include physical security, firewalls, 
auditing and above all else the human factor.   
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II. TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL AND INTERNET 
PROTOCOL 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides a brief review of Transmission 
Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) and how it 
pertains to IDS.  It looks at the TCP/IP four-layer model 
and packet architecture and investigates IP addressing and 
TCP service ports which are two tools used in the 
configuration of the buckets in Zippo.  Additionally, the 
following chapter touches on a number of other protocols 
and typical services that are of interest to system 
administrators trying to protect a network. 
 
B. TCP/IP CONCEPTS 
TCP and IP are protocols used for communication over 
one type of computer network.  A protocol, in the simplest 
definition, is a set of rules that standardize how 
something is to be done.  In the case of TCP/IP, standards 
are created so that systems can communicate with each other 
regardless of what kind of hardware they may be composed 
of.  IDS generally rely on the TCP/IP suite because they 
provide the packet architecture and addressing format used 
for packets traversing the network.   
One of the best ways to model the TCP/IP protocol and 
Internet communication is to use the four-layer TCP/IP 
Internet layered model.  This model, as presented by [BEJT-
04], is depicted in Figure 1 below and shows the different 
layers used to model the hierarchy of Internet 
communication. 
 
Web Browser
TCP
IP
Ethernet Driver
Web Server
TCP
IP
Ethernet Driver
Stream
TCP Segment
IP Datagram
Ethernet Frame
Application Layer
Transport Layer
Network Layer
Link Layer
 
Figure 1. Four-Layer Internet Model
 
The application layer of the model is supported by the 
software installed on the end nodes of the communicating 
systems (the sender and receiver).  The transport layer is 
governed by TCP (or User Datagram Protocol (UDP) in some 
instances) and is responsible for managing end-to-end 
communications between the sender and receiver.  TCP is the 
reliable connection protocol while UDP does not guarantee 
10 
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delivery of packets.  The network layer is responsible for 
getting packets from the source to the destination.  
Lastly, the link layer is the component that gets the data 
to the physical medium on which it will travel between the 
sender and receiver.   At each layer of the stack, the 
packet from the previous layer (also known as the payload) 
is wrapped up (or encapsulated) with the current layer’s 
header information.     
The TCP/IP Internet model provides a good visual aid 
to assist in understanding how packets travel through the 
hierarchy and between the sender and receiver.  Numerous 
other models exist, but the author has chosen this one as 
it gives a very simple view of TCP and IP which are the 
main protocols that most IDS are concerned with. 
Theoretically, when the sender asks for information 
from the receiver and the receiver in turn responds, the 
request follows the following path: The sender originates 
the request in the application layer of their stack.  The 
application layer packages the data from the application 
and any application protocols that are needed; this is 
referred to as the payload of the packet.  The application 
layer tells the transport layer how the packet is to be 
sent (via either TCP or UDP) and the request works its way 
down the stack, getting wrapped up (or encapsulated) in the 
TCP and IP layers through the physical layer to the 
Ethernet and over to the receiver’s stack using IP 
addressing.  The request works its way up the receiver’s 
stack to the application layer getting unwrapped in the TCP 
and IP layers as it goes.  The application layer determines 
what course of action to take with regard to the request 
12 
and if a response is necessary, the process starts over 
again and the receiver becomes the new sender. 
The path above is simplified for easy understanding 
and because the following sections will discuss TCP/IP, 
encapsulation and addressing in greater depth. 
 
C. TRANSMISSION CONTROL PROTOCOL 
TCP is the main protocol used in the transport layer.  
TCP is a reliable connection-oriented protocol that 
provides feedback to the sender’s stack ensuring proper 
delivery of the packets.  UDP, which is also a protocol 
used in the transport layer, is connectionless and is an 
unreliable protocol that is used by applications that do 
not necessarily need to ensure the arrival of their packets 
to the recipients. 
The TCP/UDP header applied at the transport layer 
includes two 16-bit port number fields that denote what 
port (between 0 and 65,535) the service desired should be 
found on (there are two as one is the source port and one 
is the destination port).  There are many well-known ports 
that are universally accepted for specific services.  Table 
1 below presents some of the more well known ports. 
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  Port Number      Service 
7 Echo 
20 ftp-data 
21 ftp-control 
22 SSH 
23 Telnet 
25 SMTP 
53 DNS 
79 Finger 
80 HTTP 
110 POP3 
111 SunRPC 
139  NetBIOS 
443 SSL 
514 RSH 
 
Table 1. Common TCP Service Ports 
 
The ports below 1024 are often referred to as the 
trusted ports and any port above 1024 is called an 
ephemeral port.  Originally, the trusted ports were to be 
used by the system processes and the ephemeral ports could 
be used by any service.  However, with the wide-spread 
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explosion of the Internet’s popularity, and the lack of 
security on it, the trusted ports are not necessarily to be 
trusted any longer.   
 Along with the services, it is important to understand 
the TCP flags in the header.  The SYN flag, or synchronize 
flag, indicates the start of a TCP conversation.  The ACK 
flag, or acknowledge flag, indicates acknowledgement or 
receipt of packets or a connection request.  The FIN flag, 
or finish flag, is used to end a session between two hosts.  
The RST flag, or reset flag, re-synchronizes a connection 
between the systems.  The PSH flag, or push flag, tells the 
sender to send data immediately vice having it “wait in 
line” to be sent. 
The TCP connection created between two hosts is 
started by a three-way handshake.  The initiating machine 
sends a SYN packet which signals to the receiver that it 
would like to start a conversation.  The recipient replies 
with a SYN and an ACK (in a single packet) to acknowledge 
the original request.  And lastly, the initiator replies 
with a final ACK.  This is how all TCP conversations are 
started and once the three-way handshake is completed, a 
connection has been created between the two hosts. 
The TCP transport model does every thing it can to 
ensure that packets are delivered to the recipient.  
Additionally, it makes certain that packets are placed into 
their proper order upon arrival so there is a sense of 
order to the message.  TCP does this by requiring an 
acknowledgement, or ACK, whenever a packet is received.  
Therefore, in a TCP “conversation” there are many packets 
going back and forth between the participants, not just in 
one direction.  UDP, on the other hand, simply packages the 
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packets and sends them off to the recipient in hopes that 
they are received.  It is much faster than TCP, but not 
nearly as reliable. 
TCP is important to IDS as it is a very often used 
protocol on the Internet.  Additionally, the service ports 
are important as often malicious behavior can be spotted by 
system administrators when the wrong types of packets are 
sent to the wrong service ports or incorrect flags are 
enabled in the TCP header.   
Once the sender’s packet is packaged by the transport 
layer, it descends down the stack to the network layer, 
which is governed by IP. 
 
D. INTERNET PROTOCOL 
The network layer of the four-layer model is the IP 
layer.  This layer is responsible for getting the packets 
from the source computer to the destination computer using 
IP addresses.  IP addresses are not actual physical 
addresses, but instead are logical addresses used by 
networks to recognize the location of networks and 
individual hosts.  The packets traverse the network by 
“hopping” between two hosts, whether they are computers or 
routers.  IP addresses are assigned to each stop on the 
journey and this, in a nutshell, is how the packet finds 
its way to its final destination.  
The IP address is included in the IP header which 
encapsulates the TCP packet which it received from the 
transport layer above.  In addition to the IP source and 
destination addresses, the IP header also includes other 
information important to its transit such as the TTL, or 
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time to live, what the protocol is (e.g. ICMP, TCP, or 
UDP), the datagram length, amplifying flags, a datagram ID 
number, fragmentation flag and other bits of information.  
For security purposes, the most important features of the 
IP header are the source and destination IP addresses.    
In the current IP version used by the majority of 
systems, the IP address is 32 bits long.  This equates to 
over 232 different addresses.  This number, although it 
seems very large, is proving too small for the high demand 
of IP addresses on the Internet.  Therefore, a new IP 
version is being introduced and slowly phased in called 
IPv6 (for Internet Protocol version 6).  With IPv6, IP 
addresses will be 128 bits in length, giving us a much 
larger address space.  For the purposes of this thesis, 32 
bit addresses will be discussed. 
The 32-bit IP address is broken down into four numbers 
most often represented by four decimal numbers separated by 
a period (e.g. 123.59.392.41).  The first section of the 
number gives an indication of the size of the network where 
the host of interest resides.  The rest of the numbers 
distinguish between the different hosts on that given 
network.   
The TCP/IP protocol suite does not have any built-in 
mechanisms to prevent a malicious user from spoofing an IP 
address when sending a packet.  However, the mere routing 
behavior of the Internet backbone and the TCP/IP protocols 
limit the ability of malicious users setting up 
communication pairs with a spoofed sender’s IP [BEJT-05]. 
An additional IP header value of interest is the 
fragmentation flag.  Fragmentation, or the breaking down of 
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bigger packets into smaller packets, generally is performed 
by TCP; however, the IP protocol also supports 
fragmentation for UDP.  Early signature-based IDS did not 
account for the fragmentation of packages and many hackers 
intentionally fragmented their harmful packets to fool the 
IDS engines into letting them on the network.  As will be 
seen later in this thesis, the basic premise of both 
Therminator and Zippo addresses problems such as 
fragmentation. 
The IP address when used in conjunction with the TCP 
service ports tell the system administrator a lot about a 
specific package.  A system administrator can easily 
recognize glaring disparities such as a web service packet 
sent to an IP address that is not a web server. Often 
times, hackers use methods such as these to gain 
unauthorized access to a system.  Both signature-based and 
anomalous-behavior intrusion detection systems use the TCP 
and IP headers to interpret the purpose of the packets and 
to gather information about their makeup, origins and 
destinations. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
The key to understanding how hosts communicate over a 
network and to understanding how many security tools, such 
as an IDS, work is in understanding the TCP/IP four-layer 
model and the TCP/IP suite of protocols.  The model 
provides a brief snapshot of the path a packet travels from 
a sender to receiver as it makes it way down one stack, 
across the network and up the recipient’s stack.  It also 
helps to explain the encapsulation process of the protocols 
contained within the model. 
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Transmission Control Protocol is a widely used 
protocol for communicating between two hosts over the 
Internet.  It provides a connection-oriented protocol that 
assures proper delivery of packets to the recipient.  The 
Internet Protocol is a set of standards that provides the 
architecture for providing logical addresses to networks, 
systems and hosts on the Internet.  Additionally, it takes 
part in the encapsulation of packets as they traverse the 
Internet and get routed to appropriate destination.  
The headers in both TCP and IP play a large role in 
IDS detection of malicious behavior and will be discussed 
more specifically in Chapters III, IV and V. 
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III. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter will discuss what an IDS is and how it 
works.  Additionally, it will look at the different types 
of IDS and the different techniques used to qualify 
packets.  And lastly, it will provide a cursory look at 
some of the factors a system administrator should think 
about while implementing an IDS.  
 
B. INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Commercial IDS first appeared on the market in the 
late 1980’s.  These were developed from products that were 
created mostly for government research and government 
networks.  Most of the IDS on the market today however, 
evolved from products that were developed in the mid- to 
late 1990’s with the proliferation of the Internet [CROTH-
03].  Intrusion detection is simply that.  It is a tool 
that is used to detect if an unauthorized someone (or 
something) has intruded on a network.  Unlike firewalls, 
which allow or disallow packets to travel onto the network 
following a rule set, an IDS is used to analyze what is in 
the packets or the packet headers to determine their 
legitimacy and to discover security violations.  Often, if 
an IDS finds malicious packets or behavior it warns a 
system administrator with an alarm and it is a human that 
ultimately has to stop the malicious activity. 
Intrusion Detection Systems come in a wide variety of 
shapes and sizes and the title itself covers a wide-breadth 
of defensive behaviors.  For instance, simple log auditing 
can be considered intrusion detection because a system 
administrator can detect if unauthorized access has 
occurred.  For the purpose of this thesis, the Intrusion 
Detection Systems being discussed are those systems that 
were developed to gather packet data on a network, analyze 
that data and create some kind of feedback to the system 
administrator, all autonomously.   
Most IDS have similar architectures to include a core 
module and sensors.  The core module generally consists of 
a repository for patterns or behavior heuristics, a 
component for analyzing the data (e.g. normalizing and 
comparing data against known malicious signatures or 
behavior) and a component to develop the feedback (e.g. 
alarms or graphs) for the user.  Figure 2 below is a simple 
diagram of the elements of an IDS.  
  
Core Module
Analyzing EngineSensor
Alarm Monitor
Repository for 
Signatures or 
Behavior Heuristics
 
Figure 2. IDS Architecture Model 
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The alarm monitor can be a reporting system, an alarm 
of some type or even a human monitoring the IDS.  It is 
simply used here as a representation of a feedback 
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mechanism for the core module.  In the core module (or 
analyzing engine), the data gathered from the sensor is 
compared with either known patterns of data or system user 
behavior heuristics, provided by the repository (i.e. 
database of malicious signatures).  The sensor can be 
implemented in software or a hardware/software mix.  It can 
be placed in many locations around the network depending on 
the information the system administrator wishes to gather.  
Location will be further discussed in a later section. 
Most IDS can be deployed in numerous ways and can use 
different techniques to carry out their tasks.  The 
specifics of Therminator’s and Zippo’s implementations will 
be discussed in the appropriate chapters.  The following 
two sections discuss the general view of implementation 
types and techniques. 
 
C. TYPES OF INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEMS 
Intrusion Detection Systems are available in two 
different types: host-based or network-based systems.  What 
distinguishes one style from another is the placement of 
the sensors (or data gatherers) which determine where the 
data is collected.  There is a hybrid that exists called 
network-node intrusion detection, but this is more often 
considered a sub-type of the network-based system [CROTH-
03].  Host-based and network-based IDS each have their own 
advantages and their own disadvantages and sets of 
challenges.  These will be discussed in the following 
sections. 
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1. Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
In host-based IDS, the system runs on the monitored 
host.  The IDS gathers its data from numerous sources on 
the host, to include items such as outbound packets, 
inbound packets, audit logs or active application 
processes.  The primary advantage of host-based IDS is that 
it can see what occurs inside a given host; it gathers very 
specific information.  Therefore, if a malicious packet (or 
packets) gets through the network security and takes up 
residence in a host machine, then the host-based IDS has 
the ability to see how that specific machine is affected. 
Other advantages of the host-based intrusion detection 
system are: since the IDS records the attack at the host it 
can monitor what happens locally in a location where 
network-based IDS cannot necessarily see, there is no 
additional hardware needed to support the IDS since it 
resides on the local system and host-based IDS does not 
rely on signatures as heavily as network-based IDS 
therefore more unknown attacks can be caught.   
   Although there have been numerous advantages 
presented for host-based IDS, it is not without its 
drawbacks.  First and foremost, a host-based IDS uses the 
host system’s resources, thereby decreasing performance of 
the monitored host.  Second, if the host is compromised by 
a hacker, so too is the IDS.  Therefore, a hacker can stop 
the monitoring agent and continue with their attack or they 
can alter the IDS reports.  Because of this, intrusion 
detection reports taken from a compromised system should 
always be considered suspect.  Lastly, host-based IDS 
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generally provide an alert only after the attacker has 
successfully compromised the system.   
The network-based IDS provides a complementary system 
to the host-based IDS and is presented in the next section. 
   
2. Network-based Intrusion Detection System 
Unlike the host-based IDS, the network-based IDS 
(NIDS) monitors and analyzes traffic as it passes on the 
network.  NIDS make up the majority of IDS available in the 
commercial market.  There are advantages to the network-
based system that are not present in a host-based IDS.  For 
instance, a network-based IDS sees the traffic going to all 
hosts on the network (if placed in the appropriate place).  
Because of this, network-based IDS can often facilitate 
stopping attacks before they can harm individual hosts.  
And if an attack does make it to a host, the NIDS IDS logs 
are not necessarily suspect as they reside on a different 
system than the host under attack.  Next, a NIDS does not 
impede the performance of specific hosts on the network.  
Since it is placed on the network and not on a system 
specific, it does not require the resources of the 
individual systems.  Because of the placement of a NIDS, it 
is able to analyze traffic coming from all hosts on its 
network collectively.  This means if there is a distributed 
attack going on, the network-based IDS will catch it which 
is something a host-based IDS is not able to do.  
Implementing a NIDS on an entire network requires a number 
of sensors and at least one main analysis engine or core 
module.  This is much less costly than installing an IDS on 
every machine on a network.  Lastly, a NIDS will be able to 
see if actions other than attacks are taking place on the 
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network (i.e. reconnaissance scans across a network to see 
which systems are up and running).   
Even with all the positive aspects of the NIDS, it too 
has its disadvantages.  First and very important, the NIDS 
has to be robust enough to handle the volume of traffic 
that comes across an entire network segment.  This has 
proven to be a very difficult task for most commercial IDS 
considering many networks run at 100 Mbps or 1 Gbps.  
Second, most NIDS have very high false positive alerts.  
This is caused by many of the systems relying on general 
signatures or poorly written signatures for pattern 
matching and therefore many packets have patterns that 
correspond to these broad signatures.  Many system 
administrators will find that their IDS alert them of many 
more false positives than authentic positives.  Writing 
accurate and specific signatures with which to match 
patterns in malicious network traffic is a challenge for 
the developers of NIDS. 
Network Intrusion Detection Systems assist system 
administrators in getting a larger picture of their 
network’s usage as compared to host-based IDS but it does 
not have the ability to see what is going on at a more 
granular level.  However, a third type of architecture 
exists which takes aspects of the network- and host-based 
IDS and combines them.  This is the network-node based IDS. 
 
3. Network-node Based Intrusion Detection System 
The Network-node based IDS monitors network traffic 
much like the NIDS does, but the intrusion detection system 
is configured in such a way that different sensors monitor 
traffic that is intended solely for them.  There usually 
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exists one main analysis module and the sensors are 
distributed around a network and on specific hosts of the 
network (i.e. a web or e-mail server) that may be more 
valuable targets.  The network-node based IDS combines the 
positive attributes of both the host- and network-based 
IDS.   
 
D. INTRUSION DETECTION METHODS 
In addition to the different types of systems, there 
are also different techniques employed to analyze the data 
collected on the network.  The two most prominent styles on 
the commercial market are signature-based and anomalous 
behavior-based (or anomaly-based) IDS.  The majority of the 
systems today are signature (or pattern) based IDS.  A more 
recent style that has appeared is patternless IDS.  This is 
the style used by Therminator and Zippo and will be 
discussed in Chapters IV and V.   
 
1. Signature-based Intrusion Detection Systems 
A signature-based IDS analyzes traffic with a program 
that compares known malicious patterns of code with the 
data collected from the network’s traffic.  If the code in 
the monitored traffic matches a malicious pattern in the 
database, then an alert is created and perhaps either sent 
to the system administrator or logged in an event log 
maintained in the analysis engine of the IDS.  There are 
three main techniques for signature-based IDS analysis: 
simple pattern matching, stateful pattern matching and 
protocol decode-based pattern matching [CROTH-03].   
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a. Simple Pattern Matching 
Simple pattern matching is the most uncomplicated 
of the three types of signature-based IDS.  Using defined 
patterns of code that are saved in the IDS database, simple 
pattern matching IDS analyze each packet on the network 
looking for a match to the malicious code. 
 
b. Stateful Pattern Matching 
In stateful pattern matching, the IDS has the 
ability to compare entire sessions with known malicious 
code.  Instead of analyzing the data, packet by packet, the 
stateful IDS will examine the full session by reassembling 
all the packets in the conversation and attempting to match 
them against a known malicious pattern.  This is more 
robust than simple pattern matching as it can catch attacks 
that are distributed over numerous packets. 
 
c. Protocol Decode-based Pattern Matching 
This type of signature-based IDS builds on 
stateful pattern matching by adding a feature to the 
analyzer that decodes for specific protocols as necessary.  
Packets are decoded at the protocol level and the session 
level to aid the system administrator in preventing attacks 
to specified protocols by focusing on broad protocol-
specific rules.  Often times, malicious users exploit 
systems by using little known aspects of protocols to gain 
access to the network.  Protocol decode-based pattern 
matching assists in combating this exploitation method. 
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2. Anomaly-based Intrusion Detection Systems  
An anomaly-based IDS analyzes network traffic with a 
program that compares the monitored traffic to stored 
normalized behavior heuristics based on network usage.  
Anomaly-based IDS have the advantage in detecting unknown 
attacks as they do not rely on defined patterns of code in 
known signatures.  In order for this type of detection to 
be useful, normal behavior must be very accurately modeled 
to have a worthwhile comparison to use.  Anomalous behavior 
can be as simple as a network login outside normal 
operating hours to a very complicated statistical pattern 
of use by a given individual over time (e.g. what time an 
individual logs in, from where an individual logs in, what 
type of traffic an individual generates, etc.).   
Anomalous behavior detection can prove to be very 
unwieldy in a sizeable organization without a well 
established and consistent work pattern.  Additionally, 
anomaly-based IDS are disadvantageous in that people 
routinely behave differently and it is difficult to 
normalize human behavior to such a degree that false 
positives are not commonplace. 
 
E. IMPLEMENTATION FACTORS 
Prior to implementing an IDS, a system administrator 
has many features of his network to think about as well as 
many different types of IDS to consider.  After creating a 
network topology and inventory of hardware/software and 
services, the system administrator needs to determine what 
IDS architecture and data analysis will work best for his 
network.  Additionally, the system administrator needs to 
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determine the overall Intrusion Detection System goals.  
The decision can be based on the size of the network, the 
geography and topology, the purpose of the network 
(including value and services offered) and the 
organization’s policies and resources.   
Once the system administrator ascertains the goals of 
the IDS and which IDS best meets them, he has to determine 
the number of sensors desired and the placement of these 
sensors, also known as monitoring zones, based on his 
perceived threats and where they will originate.  Further, 
the system administrator has to decide how incidents are to 
be handled and how policy violations are to be dealt with.      
The majority of these factors will be discussed in 
greater depth in the chapters that follow. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter discussed the basics of Intrusion 
Detection Systems and a general IDS architecture.  It also 
presented the three main types of IDS including Host-based, 
Network-based and Network-node based IDS.  Next the chapter 
illustrated the different methods of analyzing traffic 
against collections of data stored in the IDS, to include 
signature-based made up of simple pattern matching, 
stateful pattern matching and protocol decode-based pattern 
matching and anomaly-based analysis.  Finally, the chapter 
cursorily presented some factors a system administrator 
should consider prior to implementing an IDS.         
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IV. THERMINATOR 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents an in-depth look at the 
Patternless Intrusion Detection System called Therminator.  
It offers a high level description of patternless detection 
and continues with the presentation of Therminator’s 
evolution.  Next, the chapter discusses the different tools 
used in the configuration of Therminator and lastly it 
acknowledges some of the successes Therminator has realized 
in implementation. 
 
B. PATTERNLESS INTRUSION DETECTION 
To address incongruities in network traffic, beyond 
malicious patterns and anomalous behavior, a tool was 
conceived that bases its analyses on something wholly 
different than signatures and normalized human behavior, it 
uses statistical analysis and the principles of 
thermodynamics.  It is Therminator. 
Therminator is a Patternless Intrusion Detection 
System (PIDS) that uses the Ehrenfest Urn Model to 
categorize traffic flow within a monitored network [MARI-
04].  Therminator models network traffic using categories 
and conversations.  It bases its representation of a 
network on defined states and the difference in the states 
from one time period to the next.  Therminator then 
interprets these states into a three-dimensional visual 
display using the principles of thermodynamics such as 
entropy, energy and temperature. 
At any given moment, every network can be defined and 
represented by the state it is in.  The changes in the 
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state of the network are monitored and analyzed against the 
state boundary and decision definitions, supplied by the 
administrator.  The visual representation of the state can 
quickly and accurately model what is taking place in a 
network at any given point in time.  Therminator is a 
viable replacement for other IDS, but for maximum security 
of a network, this tool should be used in conjunction with 
other IDS and other tools to develop a defense in depth. 
 
C. ORIGIN OF THERMINATOR 
In 2001, two Naval Postgraduate School students, Lt. 
Stephen Donald, USN and Capt. Robert McMillen, USMC, 
developed a real-time implementation of a patternless 
intrusion detection system at the network operations center 
(NOC) in Fort Shafter, Hawaii [MCEAC-04].  This intrusion 
detection system was given the name Therminator and as 
stated above is based on statistical mechanics to translate 
a network into a series of states that are visualized into 
three dimensions by using the thermodynamic concepts of 
energy, entropy and temperature. 
The basic algorithms for Therminator were originally 
conceived by Dr. Dave Ford, currently of the Naval 
Postgraduate School, working for the National Security 
Agency.  Ford’s Therminator model, in essence, viewed 
network traffic as state transitions and modeled the system 
using the thermodynamic concepts [DONA-01].  Ford worked 
with Dr. John McEachen of the Naval Postgraduate School and 
graduate students, Donald and McMillen, to develop a robust 
version of Therminator.  It has since been revised and 
additional functionality has been added to the latest 
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version to include a GUI-based decision tree.  This newest 
version was named Zippo and will be discussed in Chapter V. 
 
D. THE BASICS 
A network can be systematically studied in the same 
way as any other closed system.  There exists in a network, 
traffic that has both an origin and a destination.  It 
flows through the network just as electrons flow in a 
closed circuit, bits on a wire.  Statistical mechanics can 
be employed to describe this flow of network traffic 
through the system.  Comparatively speaking, computer 
science is a very juvenile discipline as opposed to physics 
or mathematics.  If one could develop a way to apply 
scientific thought and behavior to a computer network, 
there should be a way to pattern the network traffic in 
such a way as to make it more understandable than an 
overwhelmingly vast list of IP source and destination 
addresses, ports, services, etc.  Dr. Dave Ford did just 
this.  He, along with others, developed a fairly complex 
system that simply and understandably portrays the traffic 
in a network. 
 
1. Buckets and Balls 
Therminator observes a network’s traffic on a 
microscopic level, one state at a time, and translates it 
into a macroscopic, easily viewed model.  A three-
dimensional visualization of a network is ultimately 
produced by the Therminator system to provide the network 
administrator the ability to study a real-time picture of 
the network’s traffic volume and what that traffic is 
doing.  Therminator uses the concept of buckets and balls 
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to categorize this traffic behavior.  The buckets represent 
the conversation groups of a network and the balls 
represent the information being passed between the 
conversation groups. 
The buckets are observed over pre-configured time 
intervals and using the thermodynamic principles previously 
mentioned, translated into three-dimensional graphs showing 
both a thermal representation of the states and the 
transitions between the states.  The bucket and ball 
analogy is best described by Donald and McMillen as follows 
 A bucket will contain some ordinal number of 
balls, and the collection of buckets and their 
respective number of balls will be the state of 
the network.  The bucket can be defined using any 
combination of conversation characteristics 
including who is talking (individual hosts or 
networks), the language they are speaking (TCP, 
UDP or ICMP), or the job they are performing 
(client or server)…A ball is a relativistic 
representation of the information a bucket 
contains.  A state transition causes a shift in 
the distribution of information between the 
buckets.  This model translates network behavior 
into state transitions by selecting a ball from 
the bucket matching the source characteristics of 
the packet and moving that ball into the bucket 
matching the destination characteristics of the 
packet, thereby redistributing the information 
and transitioning the state [DONA-01]. 
Figure 3 below is a pictorial representation of the bucket 
and balls concept described above. 
 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 3. Representation of bucket and balls concept [From 
MCEATHERM-04].  The numbers to the left represent the 
states at given instances.  The blue and red paths into the 
buckets are representative of the decisions defined by the 
decision tree. 
 
The network state is defined by the number of balls in 
each and every bucket at a specified time; like a snapshot 
of the network’s state.  As packets move, the balls move.  
Each movement of a packet equates to a ball moving from one 
bucket to another (or perhaps from one bucket back into 
itself if it follows the same path of the decision tree).  
This produces a new state.  The states are recorded for a 
defined amount of time and plotted on a three-dimensional, 
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x-y-z axis to produce the thermal canyons and thermal 
towers. 
 
2. Thermal Canyons 
 The Therminator GUI was developed to provide a user-
friendly and intelligible visual display for the system 
administrator to view the traffic on his network and to 
monitor the health of the network with regards to network 
attacks, viruses, etc.  Using the statistical analysis of 
the network traffic and translation of the state spaces, 
anomalies in network behavior are presented in a 
straightforward manner using the thermal canyons and towers 
graphics. 
 In the thermal canyon graph, the x-axis represents 
time, the z-axis represents the unique states and the y-
axis represents the number of times the unique states 
occur.  The z-axis is color-banded to provide the user a 
more visually obvious representation of any abnormalities 
that may occur and to differentiate between the numerous 
unique states.  Along the y-axis, the number of times a 
state appears is recorded and graphed as a hill or a valley 
(i.e. the numbers on the axis represent the occurrences of 
each state represented on the z-axis).   
 The system administrator can see pertinent information 
by using the interactive features of the thermal canyon 
graphs.  This information includes source and destination 
IP addresses and port numbers.  Additionally, the 
administrator can readily view the number of balls in each 
bucket.  Figure 4 below is a view of a thermal canyon. 
 
 
Figure 4. Thermal Canyon Visual Display [From MARI-04] 
 
3. Thermal Towers 
The other main graphics of Therminator’s GUI is the 
thermal towers display.  The towers display, graphs time 
along the x-axis and average ball count along the y-axis.  
Each colored bar along the z-axis represents a different 
bucket.  This graph gives the user a visual representation 
of the average ball count in each bucket over a defined 
time period.  The tower heights either increase or decrease 
with the addition or subtraction, respectively, of 
information (balls) between the conversation groups 
(buckets).  As with the thermal canyon display, IP 
addresses, port numbers and ball count in each bucket can 
be seen by using the interactive features of the graphs. 
Figure 5 below is a visual representation of the 
thermal towers. 
 
35 
 
Figure 5. Thermal Towers Visual Display [After MARI-04] 
 
E. CONFIGURING THERMINATOR 
Therminator uses decision trees to categorize data 
into conversation groups.  Some of the tools that are used 
to configure Therminator for a specific network include not 
only the decision tree, but also the slidelength and 
windowlength, and both initial and boundary conditions in 
the conversation groups. 
 
1. Decision Tree 
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Therminator uses a sniffer program, also referred to 
as a “sucker” to gather the packet data from the network.  
This data, called the thermalate, provides pertinent header 
information to the core module such as IP address 
information, TCP header information and the protocol being 
used [DONA-01].  This data is scrutinized by Therminator 
and compared in a decision tree process based on rules 
programmed into the Therminator software.  Each node of the 
decision tree has a rule assigned that ultimately creates 
the path for the balls to travel to the appropriate bucket.  
When a ball (i.e. packet) arrives at the node it is 
compared to the rules governing the node and sent down the 
relevant path.  The following excerpt from Donald and 
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McMillen explains the decision tree and ball movement 
fairly easily 
 Once, the node is located in the Matching 
Binary Tree, its state tables are checked to see 
if the packet was requested…each node has a 
linked list of current sessions divided into 
their respective protocols: ICMP, UDP and TCP.  
These protocol tables consist of pointers to the 
latest packet in a specific session or 
conversation with a specific host with the most 
recent packet pointer at the top of the list.  If 
a packet has exceeded the user defined time to 
keep information in memory (MATCH_TIME), a 
separate thread of execution is used to clear the 
remainder of the state table.  The length of the 
linked list will vary with the number of 
conversations or sessions [DONA-01].    
 
2. Slidelength and Windowlength 
The slidelength used in Terminator is the time defined 
for a single display period.  The windowlength is the total 
period of time, defined in the code, the data is averaged 
over.  Both are measured in seconds.  Each display period 
on the GUI is equal to the defined time of the slidelength.  
For example, if slidelength were defined as four, then 
every four seconds data is collected and displayed for that 
four second period.  If the windowlength is eight, then the 
data taken during the slidelength is averaged over the 
eight seconds, or two slidelengths.  Figure 6 below 
graphically presents the concept of slidelength and 
windowlength. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. [From ETTL-03] The slidelength is represented in 
any given period between each of the time intervals.  The 
windowlength is the period covered by a bar (e.g. period 
from t0 to t1 is one slidelength and the red bar titled Data 
from t2 is a windowlength).  
 
3. Initial and Boundary Conditions 
The buckets that are defined for any given decision 
tree in Therminator must be assigned initial and boundary 
conditions.  These conditions are based on the rate of 
packet traffic flow for a given network.  Initial 
conditions must be set that allow the user to view a change 
in the space.  In other words, a bucket should not be 
defined with an initial condition of zero or ten balls 
present, because if one was lost or gained, respectively, 
the state would not change.  Additionally, using a 
condition close to a boundary does not allow enough 
variation if one or two balls are lost or gained 
consecutively. 
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The initial conditions used in the majority of 
Therminator experiments and implementations thus far, have 
put the initial ball counts in the mid-range between the 
boundary conditions.  The system administrator has the 
ability to increase or decrease the number of states 
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possible by increasing or decreasing, respectively, the 
initial condition. 
The boundary conditions of the buckets have two 
limits, the upper and lower boundary.  The upper boundary 
defines the maximum number of balls any one bucket can 
have.  Conversely, the lower boundary defines the minimum 
number of allowable balls.  The optimal configuration for 
initial and boundary conditions can be determined by 
referring to Therminator: Configuring the Underlying 
Statistical Mechanics Model by Naval Postgraduate Student 
Daniel Ettlich [ETTL-03]. 
 
F. SUCCESSES OF THERMINATOR 
Therminator has been implemented in numerous 
government organizations.  Extensive testing has been done 
at the Naval Postgraduate School by many graduate students 
since Therminator’s inception.  The following sections 
discuss the successes of Therminator. 
 
1. United States Pacific Command 
In January of 2001, two students went to Fort Shafter 
at the United States Pacific Command in Hawaii to develop 
Therminator on an operational network.  Working with a 
foundation based in the theory developed by Dr. Ford, Steve 
Donald and Rob McMillen wrote, installed and implemented a 
working version of Therminator.  In March of that same 
year, Therminator achieved its first large success.  
Approximately 6,000 ICMP messages were seen in a four 
second period by Therminator.  Although ICMP packets in and 
of themselves are not anomalous, this traffic was out of 
the ordinary as the owner of the client machine was logged 
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off and at home at the time.  This traffic was undetected 
by any of the other computer network defense monitors 
installed on the system [MCEAC-04]. 
 
2. Naval Postgraduate School 
In May of 2001, Therminator was installed on the 
network at the NPS in Monterey, California.  Just two 
months later, the Code Red virus was seen by Therminator 
and the system administrators were able to react quickly 
enough to prevent any serious damage to the network.   
 
3. Commercial Success 
In November of 2002, Atlanta-based Lancope 
Incorporated, a network intelligence security company, 
bought non-exclusive license to Therminator and implemented 
it in their Stealthwatch Intrusion Detection System.  The 
high-speed data flow architecture of Stealthwatch is 
integrated with the data reduction and visualization 
technology of Therminator to provide a more robust IDS with 
both micro- and macro-views of a network [MCEAC-04]. 
 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented an overview of patternless 
intrusion detection as implemented by Therminator.  Next, 
it gave an in-depth look at how Therminator analyzes the 
thermalate by means of a decision tree process and modeling 
the packets and state conversations with buckets and balls.  
The three-dimensional visualization including thermal 
towers and thermal canyons as a way of graphically 
presenting the status of the network was presented next as 
well as the coded configuration of Therminator using 
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initial and boundary conditions of the buckets and balls 
and windowlength and slidelength.  Finally, some successes 
of Therminator were presented illustrating the practical 
use of this patternless intrusion detection system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
43 
V. ZIPPO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this Chapter, the successor to Therminator, Zippo 
will be presented.  The motivation behind the development 
of Zippo, including the drawbacks of Therminator and the 
tasking of The University of South Carolina will be 
discussed.  Next, a brief synopsis of the improvements to 
the Zippo PIDS over Therminator will be conveyed as well as 
the requirements defined by the Zippo development team.  
Concluding the chapter will be the architecture and 
implementation of Zippo. 
 
B. MOTIVATION 
The motivation behind the creation of Zippo, was to 
develop a more robust and more easily configurable program, 
based on the Therminator concept, that could be implemented 
across diverse computer systems.  Zippo was also developed 
to address the constraints found in the Therminator system.   
 
1. Therminator Constraints 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the Therminator 
Patternless Intrusion Detection System has had many 
successes in both real-world implementation and controlled 
laboratory testing.  However, in spite of its successes it 
has also had its share of constraints. 
First, Therminator is not easily configured by the 
user or the system administrator.  In order to change 
numerous aspects of the configuration (e.g. initial and 
boundary conditions and decision tree rules) it is 
necessary to change the computer code in the .config files, 
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shut-down and then restart the program for the changes to 
take place.  This is a fairly unwieldy task if the user is 
not familiar with the programming code of the system.  
Second, Therminator does not have the capability to be used 
in a distributed fashion across a computer network.  In 
Therminator, a single sensor is used to gather the 
thermalate and then report back to the analyzing engine.  
This severely limits the amount of network traffic data 
that Therminator can collect.  Third, the three-dimensional 
graphic visualizations known as the thermal canyons and 
thermal towers in Therminator are created using an 
expensive commercially licensed product that can only be 
used on the Solaris 8 system.  These three main constraints 
prompted further research into improving the next 
generation of the Therminator, Zippo. 
 
2. University of South Carolina Tasking 
Dr. John Zachary and his research team at the 
University of South Carolina were tasked by the Applied 
Research Laboratory at Pennsylvania State University to 
develop a more robust software implementation of the 
network anomaly detection model that is the basis for 
Therminator.  The new system needed to be modular, scalable 
and configurable for diverse computer systems [ZACH-04].   
 Dr. Zachary and graduate student Jun Ling developed 
Zippo in response to this tasking.  It has been installed 
and tested and proves a worthy adversary of anomalous 
behavior on a network. 
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C. ZIPPO OVERVIEW 
Dr. Zachary and his team developed Zippo, a system 
based on the Therminator concept that simplifies and 
reduces the amount of code necessary to implement a more 
robust, distributable and modular Patternless Intrusion 
Detection System.  In addition, it has an extremely user-
friendly GUI that adds significant ease in the use and 
configuration of the system. 
In the original version of Therminator, the user had 
to physically change the code in the .config files to 
define the rules that make up the decision tree and to 
identify the initial and boundary conditions of the 
conversation groups.  The new java-based GUI, provides the 
user with an interactive interface where decision trees are 
created by dragging and dropping branches and rules are 
defined by means of interactive text boxes.  Additionally, 
the initial and boundary conditions of the conversations, 
or buckets, are created interactively with text boxes as 
well. 
Zippo has also enhanced the visual displays of the 
thermal canyons and thermal towers by creating a three-
dimensional interactive “fly-over” feature.  This user can 
use the mouse to rotate the visual display to view it from 
any angle as well as zoom in and out for greater clarity of 
a given time period.  The feature still exists that allows 
the user to “drill down” to specific buckets and or time 
periods to see exact volumetric amounts. 
 Another added feature of Zippo is the ability to 
define several decision trees for a single network and the 
ability to open up thermal canyons and thermal towers for 
each of the decision trees.  This allows the user to see 
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many different aspects of the network at the same time.  
This can allow specialized configuration of Zippo for 
networks that have a disproportionate amount of other-than-
routine network traffic or individual monitoring of each 
service offered on the network.  Moreover, Zippo was 
further developed so that numerous sensors could be placed 
on a network and monitored individually or by using a 
single decision tree with a single graphic visual 
representation of the thermalate gathered by all sensors 
and collated in one report. 
 
D. REQUIREMENTS 
Zippo was developed with the following requirements: 
• Therminator’s basic modeling and interaction 
functions are to remain the same. 
• The design is based on generally accepted design 
architecture, is open and well-documented 
• Implementation is easily modified and expanded. 
• The architecture of Zippo is created using 
technologies that are readily available and 
without troublesome commercial licenses. 
• Zippo can be easily installed across diverse 
computer system platforms [ZACH-04].   
 
Additional requirements for Zippo that were noted in 
Zippo: A Robust and Portable Network Anomaly Detection 
System [ZACH-04] include a graceful shutdown and the 
ability to analyze and process a realistic flow of traffic 
at an industry standard speed. 
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E. ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION 
Zippo’s foundational architecture is a Model-View-
Controller (MVC) representation that is often used for GUI-
based software systems [ZACH-04].  The functions carried 
out by Zippo, including the collection of thermalate, the 
analysis of the thermalate, and the visual representation 
of the network traffic can be mapped onto the MVC 
architecture as follows: 
• Model: responsible for maintaining the state 
space model and carrying out the computations 
that lead to the thermodynamic representation of 
the network traffic 
• View: responsible for presenting the visual 
imagery of the thermal canyons and thermal towers 
to the user.  Also responsible for presenting the 
interactive features of the GUI. 
• Controller: responsible for translating the 
traffic packet data into thermalate, implementing 
the user’s interactive input for configuring 
Zippo and stores the thermalate 
 
1. Model 
The model is analogous to the core module/analyzing 
engine that was presented in Chapter III.  The analysis and 
computations of the thermalate are applied in this segment 
of the MVC architecture.  This is, in essence, the heart of 
they Zippo system.  It is the most memory and processor 
intensive of the three components in the MVC architecture.  
The features in the model component are implemented using 
Java code.  
 
2. View 
As stated above, the view component realizes three-
dimensional visualizations of the analyzed thermalate in 
48 
the form of thermal canyons and thermal towers that were 
discussed in Chapter III.  The view also entails the GUI 
that pertains to the Zippo Control Center (ZCC) that will 
be described in the next section.  This component ensures a 
proper presentation to the user and gathers the interactive 
data inputted by the user to be sent to the controller for 
translation into Zippo configurations.  The GUI, like the 
model, is implemented using Java code. 
 
3. Controller 
The controller is the conductor of the Zippo system.  
It processes the network packets obtained by the sensors, 
into thermalate, it stores these packets for traceability 
and forensics data and it configures Zippo according to the 
data entered by the user via the ZCC GUI.  The ZCC is the 
key module of the Zippo system that accomplishes the actual 
configuration.  The following tasks can be configured using 
the ZCC [ZACH-04]: 
• Network sensor and core configurations 
• Decision tree construction and modification 
• Administration of the thermal canyons and thermal 
towers 
• Storage of the thermalate 
       
The ZCC is implemented using Java code and the sensors are 
implemented with C++ for remote sensors and with Java code 
for local sensors.   
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4. Application Components 
To implement the gathering, analysis and visualization 
of network traffic data, Zippo uses three components: the 
sensors, the analysis engine and the GUI.  This follows the 
architectural model described in Chapter III.  The sensors 
can be either local or remote sensors.  Once they gather 
the network traffic data and translate it into thermalate, 
they pass the information to the core via a secure socket 
in OpenSSL.  The sensors rely on OpenSSL as just mentioned 
as well as pcap libraries.  These are open-source code 
libraries that are readily available to everyone.  After 
the thermalate is received by the analysis engine, it 
stores a copy of the packet information in a database and 
processes the thermalate based on the decision tree rules 
and bucket conditions defined by the users.  The 
information deduced by the core is then sent to the GUI, 
via TCP sockets, to fabricate the visualization graphics 
for viewing by the users.  All three components of the 
Zippo application can be installed on different network 
components and can communicate via the network using the 
protocols previously mentioned. 
An improvement of Zippo, over Therminator, as 
mentioned previously is the ability to use distributed 
sensors for data gathering as well as the capability of 
viewing numerous thermal canyons and thermal towers for 
different decision tree rule sets.  This allows the system 
administrator a great deal of leeway in configuring the 
application for his specific system and traffic. 
 
 
 
50 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced Zippo, the next generation of 
Therminator type PIDS.  It presented the motivation behind 
Zippo, including the constraints of Therminator and the 
tasking by Pennsylvania State University Applied Research 
laboratory and presented an initial overview of the 
application.  Next, it outlined the requirements that were 
generated prior to the development of Zippo.  And finally, 
the chapter explained in detail the architecture and 
components that make up the Zippo application. 
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VI. NETWORK TOPOLOGY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the first step of implementing an 
Intrusion Detection System is investigated.  It focuses on 
the network’s topology, its component inventory, offered 
services and monitoring zones.  Next, it looks at the 
network design and discusses some parameters that system 
administrators should take into consideration when 
creating, or rearranging, their networks.  Finally, this 
chapter addresses the topology’s relevance to IDS. 
 
B. NETWORK INVENTORY 
The first and most important step in securing a 
network is recognizing what network assets exist and which 
of them are the most valuable.  Time and time again when 
interviewing system administrator experts, this point was 
made.  Without knowing what valuable assets an organization 
has, how can a system administrator be expected to protect 
them?  The first step in discovering the most valuable 
assets, is to create a representation of the network 
topology; an extremely detailed physical map of the 
network. 
 
1. Topology 
A network topology should include all hardware, 
interfaces, IP addresses and services offered in a 
comprehensive and accurately constructed map of the 
network.  Internal and external connections should be 
annotated and perimeters should be clearly marked.  
Security systems such as firewalls and intrusion detection 
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systems should be depicted in their specific locations, to 
include the position of the IDS sensors.  Additionally, 
demilitarized zones (DMZ), or areas outside the perimeter 
often guarded by firewalls and made up of common Internet 
accessed servers such as web and email servers, should be 
illustrated.   
For large networks, a system administrator can create 
a suite of topologies that start at the highest level and 
progressively focus in on more specific assets such as 
individual monitoring zones.  A monitoring zone is a 
section of the network where the assets share certain 
privileges based on their trust levels [BEJT-05].  One 
example is the perimeter of the network.  The perimeter is 
often one of the most vulnerable interfaces of a network.  
Its protection is crucial in that “outsiders” can gain 
access from the Internet to a network via the perimeter.   
Once the logical map is created for the physical 
network, it should be considered sensitive information and 
not readily shared with individuals who do not have the 
“need to know” the network’s design.  In the wrong hands, a 
network topology can create a treasure map for malicious 
users to find their way in. 
Once the map is completed, the system administrator 
should create an itemized inventory of all the network’s 
assets including serial numbers, physical locations and 
operating systems/software.  Additionally, the relativistic 
importance or value of the assets should be annotated so 
the administrator can ensure the organization’s most 
important systems are given their due attention.   
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2. Services 
In conjunction with knowing the physical and logical 
layout of a network, it is also important to know what 
services are offered by the systems in a network.  As 
discussed in Chapter II, network services can generally be 
cross-referenced to TCP ports on computer systems.  
Services that are allowed in specific hosts can be defined 
by the ports they can be accessed by and this bit of 
information is essential to an informed system 
administrator.  If a port is open on a host and the host 
can be reached from outside the perimeter, then hackers can 
access the host if it is not safeguarded.  If a system 
administrator is unaware of the services that his hosts 
offer, he will be greatly challenged to keep those hosts 
protected from either internal or external threats.  A 
compiled list of hosts and their services is a critical 
tool for the system administrator. 
 
3. Threats 
Just as important to a system administrator as knowing 
his assets and his network’s active services, is his 
knowledge of the origin of his network’s threats.  A system 
administrator should know who or what he is protecting 
against.  This helps when developing the network design, as 
it provides additional information with which to create an 
architecture that addresses the threats.    
 
C. NETWORK DESIGN 
In the creation of a network, or development of its 
topology, it is important for the system administrator to 
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focus not only on the functionality of the network but also 
on an architecture that will emphasize security.   
There are numerous security factors to take into 
consideration when creating a network design.  First, the 
network should be designed with the intention of making 
access to unauthorized individuals as difficult as 
possible, while still providing as much functionality as 
necessary for the organization.  This means not only 
examining access from outside the network, but controlling 
access and maneuverability inside the network in case of a 
breach of the perimeter or internal malicious users.  At 
the same time, the design should make certain that the 
network is not so complicated that those monitoring its 
security cannot observe what is taking place within.   
Another factor in creating a secure network design is 
ensuring that access points, available services, active 
ports and connections are kept to as minimal level as 
possible for desired functionality and compulsory 
redundancy.  Services that are automatically offered by 
operating systems should be turned off unless they are 
absolutely necessary.  Additionally, safety measures and 
policies should exist that prevent the system users from 
turning services on without the appropriate authorization 
and privileges.   
Taking the above factors into consideration improves a 
system administrator’s chances at keeping his network 
secure, however, beyond the design and configuration of the 
network and its hosts, the system administrator must also 
create his network to facilitate ease of maintenance.  
Every week, patches and updates are provided to information 
technology users to fix bugs and weaknesses in their 
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systems so malicious users cannot exploit them to gain 
unauthorized access.  When designing a network, an 
administrator needs to make certain that the architecture 
of the network is such that he has unobstructed access to 
the systems in order to apply the patches and updates.  The 
entire network needs to be easily updateable.  If even one 
host on a network is not kept current, an entire system can 
be exploited.   
The suggestions for network design above are obviously 
not all-inclusive; however, they provide sound advice to 
system administrators developing network architectures and 
address several issues that can easily be overlooked if 
network functionality alone is focused on. 
 
D. IDS 
When implementing an IDS, it is critical that the 
system administrator has total knowledge of the network in 
question.  Asking an administrator to secure a network with 
no, or limited knowledge of its topology, interfaces, 
access points and connections is like asking someone to 
drive across the country, blind-folded and without a guide.  
In other words, it is impossible. 
As discussed in previous chapters the PIDS, Zippo, 
relies on sensor placement and knowledge of network 
configuration with respect to IP addresses and services, to 
create a worthwhile visualization of the network’s traffic.  
If a system administrator is ignorant to the location of 
the network’s servers, the services they offered or the 
authorized users, he would not be able to configure the 
decision trees to provide him any information that could 
assist in the network’s security.  Zippo would be useless 
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to him.  Therefore it is important for the administrator to 
know his network intimately. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the most important aspect of 
creating a secure network, knowing the network.  It 
detailed the important steps of creating a network 
topology, knowing the services and knowing the threats 
against the network.  It presented factors to keep in mind 
when creating a network design and ultimately offered the 
importance of intimately knowing the network to implement 
an IDS.       
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VII. ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
In this chapter, the elements of good policy 
development will be presented, along with sources of policy 
creation.  In addition, factors that influence 
organizational policy will be looked at.  Lastly, security 
elements that implement policy will be presented as well as 
thoughts on publishing and distribution of policies. 
 
B. POLICY CREATION 
An important asset that every organization should have 
to assist in securing its network is an organizational 
policy pertaining to network use and security practices.  A 
thorough and unambiguous policy provides a system 
administrator with a tool that he can use to make control 
and access decisions.  Having a policy approved by an 
organization’s executives and ensuring it is enforceable is 
crucial to a system administrator attempting to defend a 
network.  Policy is implemented by security tools such as 
firewalls and IDS.  Rules applied to these security tools 
are defined by the policies of the organization.  For 
example, prior to implementing an IDS on a network, the 
administrator must know what the policy is in order to 
configure the IDS to recognize normal traffic and anomalous 
behavior.  But what makes a good policy? 
 
1. Elements 
A policy has three main elements: authority, scope and 
expiration [NORETAL-03].  The authority of a policy refers 
to its status in the hierarchy of rules that regulate the 
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network’s security.  In other words, where does the 
policy’s authority originate.  For example, in the 
Department of Defense, there are numerous levels of 
authority that apply to organizational policies.  
Generally, these are hierarchical.  Organizations that 
create their own policies must adhere to the guiding 
principles of those commands superior to them in their 
chain of command.  Policies created at subordinate commands 
can be more restrictive, but not more lax than those which 
govern them.  The authority of a policy is closely related 
to the scope.   
The scope of the policy refers to who the policy 
applies to.  Does it apply to the entire organization, or 
sub-groups within the organization?  Does it apply to just 
the perimeter or the internal network as well?  This is a 
very important aspect of creating an unambiguous policy and 
generating the rules that enforce the policy.  When 
implementing intrusion detection systems, if the scope of 
the policy is unknown, effective rules cannot be written.  
And since networks, organizations and threats change, so to 
should the scope of policy. 
An organization’s IT security policy should be 
reviewed and updated on a regular basis as well as when 
specific circumstances dictate.  The scope and the 
authority that prescribe rules and regulations for the 
policy are not static.  Neither are the threats that 
imperil a network’s safety.  All of these elements, 
authority, scope and expiration must be taken into 
consideration when creating an organizational policy. 
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2. Written 
Most organization’s have more than one written policy 
that addresses IT security.  It is important for the system 
administrator to thoroughly research all policies prior to 
implementing an IDS.  Better yet, it would behoove the 
administrator to create a single policy containing all the 
rules pertinent to the network.  It is much easier to 
create control and access rules from one compiled document 
than from numerous documents floating around an 
organization.   
Written policy can be found in more than just IT 
documents.  It can be found in organizational memos, 
employee handbooks, directives from system administration 
and many other publications.  It is the system 
administrator’s challenge to create rule sets that address 
all the policies, not to mention de-conflict the policies 
to be enforceable and practicable. 
Written policies are a way of communicating the rules 
and regulations that govern the use of a network to all 
users.  The system administrators need to make certain that 
the policies correctly reflect the desired allowable uses 
of the network.  Since the control and access of the 
network is based on the policies, it is imperative that 
these rules and regulations clearly reflect allowable and 
unallowable behavior. 
 
3. Verbal 
Along with the written publications in an organization 
that dictate policies, verbal guidance also exists.  This 
can be formal or informal; although it generally tends 
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toward informal (e.g. “the administrator said I could”).  
It is important for the system administrator to take the 
verbal policies into consideration when creating the 
overarching guidance for the organization.   
Verbal policies should be analyzed to determine if 
they are in adherence with published policies and best 
practices of network security.  All too often, weaknesses 
are created in secure networks because users download 
unapproved programs or enable unauthorized services as they 
are not made aware of the network’s security policy or the 
governing rules and regulations.  Instead, they are 
ignorant of the repercussions of informal or non-existent 
policies.   
Verbal policies should be discouraged and the rules 
and regulations that govern an organization’s network ought 
to be formalized, written and approved by an organization’s 
authorities.  If there is an absolute need to change 
network policy “on the fly”, the changes should be 
documented and evaluated against the standing policy to 
ensure gaps are not created in the network’s security. 
 
C. POLICY INFLUENCES 
Policy can be influenced by any number of things.  
People, hardware, network topology, threats, etc. are all 
factors that should be taken into consideration when 
developing policies.  The following paragraphs address just 
a few of the important influences on network policy. 
Network components’ physical locations and logical 
connections are very important influences on the 
development of network policy.  First, from a physical 
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standpoint, hardware, software and often times knowledge 
residing on systems, must be physically secured by locks, 
security guards or other means.  Policy needs to reflect 
the physical security of a network. 
In addition, the logical topology of the network 
dictates policy creation.  The network perimeter, the DMZ 
and the servers that allow public or remote access are all 
factors that should influence the security policy.  
Creating a highly detailed network map and inventory as 
discussed in Chapter VI is very important for establishing 
the policy’s foundation.  If the system administrator does 
not know what his assets are, where they are located, their 
IP addresses, installed applications or what services they 
are running, he cannot create rules that accurately focus 
on the threats. 
Along with the physical assets and the network 
topology, the threats to a system also heavily influence 
policy.  The administrator needs to make certain he knows 
what assets are high-value targets and where the threats 
originate.  Is the Internet a concern?  Is malicious 
internal traffic probable?  Knowing what the threats are 
enables the administrator to properly address them with 
policy.   
Lastly, but definitely not least of all, people 
influence policy.  Users directly influence policies from 
the standpoint of identification, authentication, 
privileges, authorizations and unintentional misuse.  
Policies need to address all of Murphy’s Laws in network 
administration.  In developing policy, a system 
administrator should assume that anything a user can do 
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wrong will be done and he should create his policies to 
address that concern.   
 
D. POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 
Policy is implemented in numerous ways.  Physical 
security directly implements the physical safety of network 
assets.  Firewall rules are applied at the perimeter to 
carry out policy that allows/disallows specified network 
traffic.  Rules of behavior and regulations of network use 
are published and are guides for network users to follow in 
order to adhere to an organization’s policy.  Management 
implements policy by holding individuals accountable for 
their actions and for observing the policy rules. 
What is important for system administrators and the 
management of an organization is to ensure that policy that 
is implemented is supported and put into practice by all 
users.  Policy should address the goals system 
administrators have for their networks.  It should be 
implemented to support the network’s purpose and the 
organization’s mission.  However, above all else, 
implemented policy must ensure safety to the best of its 
ability.  
The security plan, presented in the next chapter, is 
an ideal tool to implement an organization’s policy.  Its 
sections include thorough and detailed information 
pertaining to the security of a network.  Chapter VIII 
presents the security plan in fine detail and will further 
discuss how policy is implemented.   
In order to implement policy to users, it is important 
that the policy is published and distributed accordingly.  
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Generally an organization will have different levels of 
users and the policies should reflect the privileges 
afforded to each. Similar to the network inventory and 
topology, policies concerning firewalls, IDS, system 
monitoring etc, should be held as sensitive documents.  If 
malicious users can gain insight into the rules that 
protect a network, they can exploit the holes created by 
them. 
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented the creation of organizational 
policy with respect to networks.  It discussed the elements 
that make a good policy and policy creation based on 
written documents and verbal understandings.  Some of the 
influences of policy creation were presented as well as 
different tools that assist in implementing the policy.   
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VIII. SECURITY PLAN 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents yet another asset that should be 
in place prior to implementing an IDS.  The purpose of a 
security plan is presented as well as the components that 
make up a security plan.  Lastly, guidance and references 
will be included for the system administrator’s development 
of the security plan. 
 
B. PURPOSE 
What is a security plan and why is it needed to help 
keep a network secure?  According to many government and 
commercial organizations, a security plan is a thorough 
document that touches on every facet of a network’s 
security and compiles it neatly into a “one-stop shop” for 
finding security requirements, controls, policy, 
responsibilities and future plans to meet any shortcomings 
determined in the development of the plan.  In fact, most 
government agencies are required by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130 and Public Law 
100-235 to develop and maintain a security plan [NIST-98]. 
A security plan is developed to protect an 
organization’s assets.  It documents every facet of an 
information technology program to include not only those 
aspects listed in the above paragraph but also such items 
as responsibilities and expected behaviors of the all 
individuals who access the system, physical security 
requirements and managerial, operational and technical 
controls to address the appropriate risks.  Without a 
security plan an organization would have an uneven and ad 
66 
hoc approach to network security, and weaknesses would be 
much more likely, if not absolute.  
It is very important that a security plan is developed 
for a network.  As stated numerous times before, adding 
security measures in an unplanned or informal manner can 
cause just as much harm to a network as it can provide 
protection.  A security plan is a required asset that 
should be in place before Intrusion Detection Systems are 
installed as the plan provides significant information and 
details for creating the IDS rules.    
The system administrator is responsible for ensuring 
the security plan is developed.  The system owner is 
ultimately responsible for the plan, but for purposes of 
this thesis, the administrator is considered the owner.  
Besides developing it, the administrator is also 
responsible for implementing and maintaining the plan.  It 
should be considered a living document and should be 
revered as the law in managing the network.   
When the plan is completed it will contain technical 
information about the network, security requirements of the 
network and the controls that are or will be put in place 
to address the risks and vulnerabilities of the system.  
Because of this, the security plan, just like the network 
topology map, the asset inventory and the policies, should 
be treated as a sensitive document and only those sections 
that are meant for the public should be distributed.  If a 
malicious user were to obtain any of the documents 
presented thus far, he would have enough information to 
exploit an organization’s network. 
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For purposes of this thesis, the NIST Special 
Publication 800-18 Guide for Developing Security Plans for 
Information Technology Systems is used as guidance. 
 
C. COMPONENTS 
The following subsections outline the components that 
should be included in a thorough security plan: General 
Information, Management Controls, Operational Controls and 
Technical Controls.  This is a brief presentation of them 
and more detailed information can be found in the NIST 
Special Publication 800-18.  The components listed below 
follow the NIST publication’s outline [NIST-98]. 
 
1. General Information 
The first section should include general information 
about the system in question.  It should contain 
information regarding who is responsible for the system 
(i.e. organization and personnel) and who maintains the 
system to include contact information.  If there are 
different personnel assigned to other functions such as a 
separate security officer for the system, these people 
should also be listed with their contact information.   
The system operational status must be defined for the 
system.  It can include either operational, under 
development or undergoing a major modification.  If 
different monitoring zones in the system fall under 
different statuses, then all zones and their status should 
be reported.  Along with the operational status, a 
description and purpose of the system and the operational 
environment of the system must be presented. 
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The last section under the general information segment 
should include the system interconnection information, 
which includes the connections used by the system for 
sharing information resources, and a description of the 
types of information handled by the system and its 
criticality.  The laws, regulations and policies pertaining 
to the confidentiality, integrity and availability of the 
data in the system should be presented here as well as a 
description of the data’s sensitivity.  
 
2. Management Controls 
In this section, the management controls that are 
either in place or that will be put in place are presented.  
Management controls are those controls that address the 
management of the system, the management of the information 
contained in the system or the management of the system’s 
risk.  To determine the controls that need to be put in 
place, a risk assessment should be done.  This should 
include determining the value of the system’s assets 
(including the data contained within), threats to the 
system, vulnerabilities of the system and the safeguards 
currently in place and their effectiveness.   
The OMB Circular A-130 requires that all systems 
receive an independent review of their system on a periodic 
basis.  The management controls section should contain 
information pertaining to the review including the type of 
review conducted and any of the findings.  Additionally, it 
should address the planned corrections of any deficiencies 
found during the review.   
Rules of behavior are presented in the management 
controls section as well.  These rules should address 
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expected behavior of all users, responsibility delineation 
of users and administrators, limits on interconnection and 
restoration priorities in case of failure and other topics 
such as remote access, accountability, use of equipment, 
etc.  Additionally, the rules of behavior should include 
the penalties of violating the rules and should be provided 
to all users and acknowledged (in writing) prior to system 
access being granted.  Different levels of behavior may be 
necessary for different systems.  System administrators 
should have behavior rules evenly balanced with their 
responsibilities.  For this reason, system users and system 
administrators may have totally different sets of rules and 
the management control section should address both. 
The rules of behavior should be written in line with 
the policies of the security systems.  If a firewall is 
setup to disallow ftp traffic, then the administrative 
rules should state that ftp is not allowed.  This way, 
there is redundant system of checks.   
The last part of the management controls section 
consists of the life cycle security of the system.  Here, 
the plan should include how security is implemented in each 
phase of the system’s life cycle.  Special Publication 800-
18 defines five phases to a system’s life cycle that must 
be addressed: Initiation, Development or Acquisition, 
Implementation, Operations and Maintenance and Disposal.   
 
3. Operational Controls 
Operational controls are those controls which address 
the security measures implemented by people, vice policies 
implemented by the system itself.  Controls that should be 
addressed in this section include: Personnel Security, 
70 
Physical and Environmental Protection, Production and 
Input/Output Controls, Contingency Planning, Application 
Software Maintenance Controls, Data Integrity/Validation 
Checks, Documentation, Security Awareness and Training.   
The operational controls section focuses on the human 
factor of network security.  The personnel security, 
physical and environmental protection focus on the 
safekeeping of the system assets from malicious users and 
security attributes of the physical location of the system, 
to include such problems as fire safety and pilfering.  
Production and input/output controls deal with security 
steps for proper handling, copying, transferring, 
inputting, printing, storing and disposing of data 
contained on the network, as well as, the maintenance of 
application software.         
  Contingency planning, discussed in the operational 
controls section, entails a description of the steps 
carried out to ensure backups exist in case of a 
contingency.  This should include frequency of backups, 
location of backups, roles and responsibilities of users 
and administrators in case of contingency and should 
annotate if any additional disaster or contingency plans 
exist for the organization and where to find them. 
The data integrity and validation controls subsection 
should include information on any virus software, integrity 
checkers, firewalls, IDS or other security systems in place 
to maintain and check for data integrity and validity.  
This section contains policies such as how often passwords 
are checked and if message authentication is used.  In 
short, this subsection covers any application or control 
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that is used to ensure the integrity, authenticity and 
validity of data on the network. 
Next, the operational controls section addresses two 
very important administrative actions.  The first is 
documentation.  This subsection should list all 
documentation that pertains to any hardware, software, 
policies, rules and regulations, backup activities or any 
other facet of the network that has documentation.  
Maintenance of documentation is very important for a system 
administrator to preserve some semblance of order on his 
network.  Too often applications, policies or 
configurations are changed without being documented and 
without a system administrator’s knowledge and this is a 
detriment to the security of a system.  Documentation 
should be thorough and readily available to those who need 
it.   
The second administrative feature presented in the 
operational controls section is security awareness and 
training.  This is a very important and necessary control 
to implement.  A system is only as secure as the 
individuals using it.  The security plan should reflect 
what training is provided, how often, to whom and how the 
responsible training personnel ensure everyone is 
adequately trained.  This section should not be taken 
lightly as many viruses, back doors and other malicious 
behavior is initiated by unsuspecting and unknowledgeable 
system users. 
Lastly in the operational controls section, is the 
capability of the organization to provide incident 
response.  Here, the organization should publish what steps 
are to be taken in the case of a breach of the network’s 
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security.  The incident handling procedures should include 
such items as reporting requirements, responder’s actions 
and what preventive measures are in place.  Carrying out a 
well-rehearsed incident response plan is important to 
minimizing the amount of damage an intruder or an attack 
can inflict.   
 
4. Technical Controls 
The technical controls of a system are those that are 
executed by the system itself.  They may be initiated by a 
user, but they are carried out automatically by the system.  
The first of these controls presented is for identification 
and authentication of users.  The security plan should 
describe how users are uniquely identified and 
authenticated.  The techniques and mechanisms used to carry 
out the identification and authentication process should be 
explained in detail here. 
Once the identification and authentication processes 
are detailed, then the authorization and access controls 
can be presented.  These controls delineate who is allowed 
to access what.  This section should explicate how the 
system ensures only authorized personnel gain access to the 
allowable systems or applications as well as the 
organizational policies that define what authority is 
granted to each of the users. If encryption is used by the 
system, this section should address the methodologies 
utilized.  In addition to the logical access controls for 
the organization’s personnel, public access controls should 
be defined for applications that are accessible by the 
general public. 
73 
The last component addressed in the technical controls 
section is the audit trail.  This is a record of system or 
application use by specific users or processes.  An audit 
trail can be very helpful in intrusion detection, user 
accountability, system health and other facets of network 
administration.  This section should discuss the audit 
trail mechanisms in place on the network.   
 
D. GUIDANCE 
As stated above, the NIST Special Publication 800-18 
is a very thorough document pertaining to security plans.  
It is simply a guide to aid the system administrator in 
development of the security plan.  Other NIST publications 
as well as other government documents are available to 
assist with the composition of the security plan.   
System administrators need not reinvent the wheel when 
creating their security plans.  Many templates and 
completed plans are available from commercial and 
government organizations.   
 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter introduced the NIST Special Publication 
800-18 Security Plan.  It discussed the importance of 
having a security plan in place to defend a network and to 
provide adequate documentation and guidelines to system 
administrators as well as system users.  The components of 
the security plan were discussed and were broken down into 
sections addressing managerial, operational and technical 
controls that should be established for the network.  
Lastly, a brief section discussing general guidance was 
provided.  
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  IX. CONFIGURING ZIPPO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents the methodology to implement 
Zippo on a system.  It starts with a brief explanation of 
the threats and vulnerabilities of a system as they pertain 
to Zippo.  Next it discusses the hardware requirements and 
configurations of Zippo and the optimal sensor placement.  
Lastly, it presents the methodology for configuring the 
decision trees (buckets and balls). 
 
B. RISKS AND VULNERABILITIES 
As discussed in the previous chapters of this thesis, 
the most important piece of information a system 
administrator needs to protect his network is what 
specifically he needs to protect and from whom or what he 
needs to protect it.  Carrying out a risk assessment as 
part of the security plan and creating a network topology 
and inventory are key steps in finding the high value 
targets of an organization’s network and the 
vulnerabilities that exist within a network.  If an 
organization’s lifeblood is the data kept in a data 
warehouse contained in their network, then their primary 
security concern should be keeping that data warehouse safe 
and impenetrable to unauthorized users.   
Most organizations have high-value targets.  Whether 
they are as simple as files that contain personnel 
information or as complex as global data warehouses, 
organizations need to protect them.  The completion of an 
organizational policy, security plan and network topology 
and inventory is vital to a system administrator in 
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determining what his high value targets are, where the 
threats to these targets lie and the vulnerabilities on the 
network that may exist.   
Once the administrator knows what he has to protect, 
he then must determine his overall objective for Zippo.  
Does he want to employ Zippo as a simple monitoring device 
to show the traffic on the entire network or just the 
traffic intended for one service?  Does he want to create 
an interface that permits an alert program to “read” 
Zippo’s visual displays and alert him when the traffic is 
out of the ordinary?  To determine these objectives, the 
system administrator needs to equate the abilities of Zippo 
with his network’s risks and vulnerabilities.   
Zippo can assist the system administrator in detecting 
attacks that threaten specific systems, attacks that get 
past the firewall and attacks meant for specific services.  
Additionally, Zippo can also provide the system 
administrator with important details about normal network 
usage and specific information regarding the source, target 
and types of attack that happen on the network.   
Once the system administrator knows his objectives, 
his risks and his vulnerabilities he is ready to deploy 
Zippo on his network. 
 
C. HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE 
As discussed in Chapter V, Zippo was not developed as 
a platform specific application.  Its sensors and analyzing 
engine are written in Java code and C++ and can be deployed 
on different hosts throughout the network or on a single 
host.  There are software requirements to properly run 
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Zippo, but all programs are open source and can be 
downloaded from their Internet sites.  The sensors rely on 
Open SSL (libssl and libcrypto) and pcap (libpcap) 
libraries [ZACH-04].  The core, written in Java code, 
requires Java Run Time to properly execute.  It was 
developed using Java 2 SKD 1.4.2, so the developers 
recommend this version to properly employ Zippo. 
Hardware availabilities should be considered prior to 
deploying Zippo on a network.  Of course, the ultimate 
factor in configuring systems is resources, but if the 
resources are available the following presents optimal 
configurations.  
The core function of Zippo requires a substantial 
amount of processing power, as does the visual display 
graphics presented by the Zippo Control Center.  The more 
CPU power, RAM and hard drive storage space available, the 
more capable and efficient Zippo will be.  A beneficial 
hardware configuration for Zippo is a dedicated host 
employed specifically for its core functions and a 
dedicated host for its GUI component.  Processing and 
storing millions of packets of thermalate requires a lot of 
CPU horsepower and isolating Zippo on its own host keeps it 
from having to “fight” with other applications for a share 
of the processor.  Additionally, the GUI component of Zippo 
requires dedicated processing power for real-time three-
dimensional visualization of the thermal canyons and 
thermal towers and to run the ZCC which allows the user to 
interface with the interactive GUI in constructing Zippo’s 
many configurable variables.  The user needs to make 
certain that the GUI component is connected to the core 
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process using the IP address and TCP socket of the system 
running the core component. 
The sensors of Zippo can be realized in either a 
remote host or on the local host of the core component.  
Zippo can have only one sensor or many sensors can be 
deployed in a distributed manner.  Placement of sensors 
will be discussed in the next section.  Remote sensors are 
coded in C++ and local sensors in Java code.  As stated 
above, the sensors rely on OpenSSL and pcap libraries, 
therefore these source codes must exist on the host(s) 
where the sensor(s) reside.  Like the GUI component, the 
sensor’s configuration file must stipulate the IP address 
and TCP port of the core component as well. 
The hardware used for sensor hosting is dependent on 
the amount of traffic flow that needs to be sucked off the 
network for transforming to thermalate.  In Table 2 below, 
recommended sensor hardware is presented. 
 
Component Lightly Used T-1 
or Less 
Well-Used T-1 to 
Lightly Used T-3 
Well-Used T-3 
or Higher 
CPU Pentium II 300MHz Pentium III 750MHz Pentium IV 
1GHz or more 
RAM 256MB 512MB 1GB or more 
Hard Drive 20GB 80GB 240GB or more 
PCI bus 32 bit 32 or 64 bit PCI-X or PCI 
Express 
Table 2. [From BEJT-05] Hardware recommendations for 
sensors of Intrusion Detection System 
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D. SENSOR PLACEMENT 
To optimally place the Zippo sensors, the system 
administrator must make use of his knowledge of the 
system’s assets, threats, vulnerabilities and offered 
services.  The sensor placement should address the policies 
of the organization and the vulnerabilities discovered in 
the network’s topology.  They should be situated in the 
network such that the traffic of interest can be seen by 
them for forwarding to the core component.  Additionally, 
the sensors should be adequately protected so malicious 
users cannot access and exploit them.   
 
1. Valuable Assets 
In creating the network topology and inventory, 
policies and security plan, the system administrator has 
collected all the information he needs to appropriately set 
his sensors.  His primary focus should be on the critical 
systems and the network weaknesses.  The sensors should be 
able to see all traffic destined for and coming from the 
critical systems.   
If a network is connected to the Internet (or other 
interfaces for sharing information), this is a 
vulnerability that must be addressed by Zippo.  A sensor 
would be well placed to see all Internet traffic destined 
for the organization’s network and leaving it.  If this 
proves to be too weighty of a task for the sensor due to 
the volume of traffic on the network, numerous sensors can 
be placed to address the different subnets of a network.   
Additionally, a sensor should be placed inside the firewall 
of the organization’s internal network to process incoming 
and outgoing traffic that has gotten past the firewall or 
originated internally, respectively.   
If a network contains a DMZ which allows public access 
to numerous servers (i.e. Web servers, DNS, etc), a Zippo 
sensor should be placed to gather the traffic flow here as 
many exploits specifically target these vulnerabilities.  
In Figure 7 below, a general network is represented with 
the sensor placement shown. 
Internet
Email Server
FTP Server
DNS Server
Boundary Router Internal Network Switch/Hub
DMZ Switch/Hub
Firewall
`
Zippo Remote
Sensor 
`
Zippo Core Component
w/Local Sensor
Web Server
 
Figure 7. General network with Zippo sensors placed within 
the DMZ and locally on the internal network. 
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2. Services 
A second tactic a system administrator can use to 
employ the Zippo sensors is to look at the services offered 
by his network.  As shown in Figure 7 above, a DMZ resides 
on this network.  Web servers, FTP servers and email 
servers, to name just a few, are all targets of opportunity 
for unauthorized access.  If a network consists of low 
hanging fruit housed in a DMZ, it would behoove the system 
administrator to place a sensor in this section of the 
network.  Additionally, if specific hosts inside the 
internal network provide easily exploitable services, these 
should be watched by Zippo’s sensors.   
Zippo was developed to support numerous sensors placed 
around a network with one central core component.  The 
thermal canyons and towers can be configured to represent a 
single host or a single service, based on the rules of the 
decision tree.  This provides the system administrator with 
a finer granularity when monitoring the hosts on his 
network.   
 
E. BUCKETS AND BALLS 
The buckets and balls are the implementation of the 
decision tree, which determines the appearance of the 
thermal canyons and thermal towers, based on the decision 
tree’s nodes and boundary/initial conditions configured by 
the system administrator.  Network packets are processed by 
the core component based on the decision tree which is 
modeled after expected normal traffic behavior on the 
network.  The decision tree’s branches are defined by the 
topology of the network and the protocols.   
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The effectiveness of Zippo relies on the rules sets 
created for the decision tree and the boundary/initial 
conditions of the bucket spaces.  Without adequate 
knowledge of normal traffic on a network, it is a true 
challenge to the system administrator to properly construct 
the decision tree to adequately screen and report on 
anomalous or malicious traffic.   
 
1. The Decision Tree 
In Zippo, PID instances are created by the user to 
define a specific decision tree to be applied to the 
traffic collected by the sensors.  Numerous PID instances 
can be created and applied to the same traffic gathered 
from the sensors, depending on the information the system 
administrator is interested in (e.g. port lists, IP lists, 
etc.).   
Zippo is configured such that the decision tree nodes 
can be of different types.  A node can represent an IP 
list, a port list, new friends, matched packets or protocol 
lists.  The leaves of the decision tree are the instances 
of the buckets, which are configured by the path of the 
decision tree branches a ball travels along to get there.  
Defined by the tree’s branches, the buckets represent 
origins, destinations, protocols and ports or any 
combination of these variables.  Viewing the number of 
balls in each of the buckets at any given time, defines a 
state.  The states change as balls move in and out of the 
buckets.  These are the state transitions.  In Figure 8 
below, an example decision tree is shown to illustrate the 
nodes, branches and leaves (buckets). 
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Figure 8. Decision Tree representing a PID instance.  Each 
node represents a decision point and each bucket defines a 
set of rules.  
 
In Zippo, the defining of the decision tree is 
analogous to creating an access control list in a firewall 
or the signatures in a signature-based IDS.  It is the most 
important step the system administrator makes in 
configuring Zippo to his specific network.   
It is very difficult to create a recipe for all system 
administrators with all types of networks to configure the 
decision tree.  Therefore a general discussion of the 
decision tree with regard to configuration is presented. 
The first step in configuring the decision tree is 
determining what “normal” traffic looks like and what level 
of granularity is of interest.  The decision tree can then 
be configured based on this normal traffic.  In addition 
the system administrator needs to determine what entities 
are to be monitored and to what detail.  In reference to 
Figure 8 above, the top level (IP List node) applies the 
rule to the IP address of the packet.  The system 
administrator can define this for a single IP address, a 
range of IP addresses or any configuration in between.  If 
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an IP address matches the rule in the top node, it 
progresses down the decision tree to be tested at each 
node.   
The buckets at the bottom of the decision tree (or the 
leaves of the tree) are defined by the path the packets (or 
balls) take to get there.  For example, bucket number 1 in 
figure 8 above has the identified IP address, protocol and 
port that are defined by the nodes in the branches above 
it.  The system administrator can use these nodes to create 
a rule set just like an ACL for a firewall.   
If a system administrator is checking the network for 
specific threats that are identified by the ports they 
communicate on or the protocols they use, Zippo and its 
decision tree provide an exceptional tool to the 
administrator to isolate suspicious packets.  The decision 
tree’s nodes can be configured to look for specific 
malicious port use or protocol use out of the ordinary. 
Along with looking for suspicious ports or protocols, 
a system administrator can configure the decision tree to 
see traffic patterns to individual servers such as a web 
server or a DNS server.  For example, if traffic going to a 
web server attempts to communicate in a protocol other than 
http or attempts to create a connection on a port other 
than 80, and the administrator configures the decision tree 
to recognize these misguided packets, the visual display 
presented by the thermal canyons and thermal towers can 
alert the system administrator to the irregularity. 
The decision tree provides a very flexible 
configuration tool for Intrusion Detection.  It does not 
rely on defined signatures or abnormal behavior by users.  
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And with Zippo, changes to the decision tree can be made 
with a simple GUI and implemented immediately.  The system 
administrator must determine what packet information is 
important to him and implement those choices with the 
decision tree’s nodes.  And as so eloquently presented in 
[MYLAV-04],  
Any model and associated system implementation 
depend on careful configuration of appropriate 
parameters to reflect the expected or assumed 
behavior of the underlying process to which the 
model is applied. 
 
2. Bucket Conditions 
Along with the definition of the decision tree nodes, 
the system administrator must also define the boundary and 
initial conditions of the buckets.  The boundary conditions 
are the maximum and minimum number of balls allowed in each 
of the buckets.  The larger the disparity between the 
boundary conditions, the larger the number of states that 
can be represented in any one bucket.   
The initial condition of the buckets is the number of 
balls that start out in each bucket when the PID instance 
is started.  Boundary and initial conditions were 
researched by Daniel Ettlich in [ETTL-03] and Marinovich 
and Walch in [MARI-04] and are presented in both 
references. 
 
F. THERMAL CANYONS AND TOWERS 
As discussed in previous chapters, the thermal canyons 
and towers are Zippo’s three-dimensional representation of 
the network’s traffic.  Configuring these visual displays 
properly is imperative for the system administrator to 
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adequately see the changes in the states of the network’s 
traffic and notice anomalies.  Slidelength and windowlength 
are two of the defining parameters that dictate what the 
thermal canyons and towers look like.  These are described 
in greater detail in Chapter IV.  The ratio of the 
windowlength to the slidelength is known as the smoothing 
ratio or smoothing factor.  These variables determine how 
the thermal canyons and thermal towers appear in the 
graphical display.   
 
G. ZIPPO’S VARIABLES 
Zippo’s variables are configured using the Zippo 
Control Center.  The configuration parameters for the core 
component include the Number of States, Number of Time 
Slices, Slide Length and Smoothing Factor [ZACH-04].  These 
differ from the original coded variables in Therminator and 
are easier to enter using the interactive console. 
Buckets in Zippo are defined using the interactive 
configuration screen for the bucket element.  The defined 
variables include the bucket name, minimum, maximum and 
initial ball counts and bucket colors.  Zippo automatically 
transfers a bucket’s color to the decision tree and to the 
thermal tower visualization.  This gives the system 
administrator a clear visual picture as to what defined 
balls are showing in the towers. 
 
H. SUMMARY 
This chapter explored the configuration of Zippo.  It 
presented the steps to take in making Zippo an integral 
part of a network’s defense in depth.  It discussed how to 
implement Zippo in order to address the risks and 
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vulnerabilities of the network as well as the sensor 
placement to protect valuable assets and address specific 
services.  It touched on the hardware and software required 
to run Zippo regardless of platform.   
Next, the specific variables of Zippo were discussed 
including how to build the decision tree and how to 
configure the bucket spaces.  Lastly, the thermal canyons 
and towers were briefly presented in reference to the view 
they presented to the system user. 
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X. MONITORING ZIPPO 
A. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
This chapter presents a brief introduction to 
monitoring Zippo.  It discusses previous experiments done 
by students researching Therminator and Zippo’s ability to 
detect malicious activity in a network.  Lastly, it shows 
some examples of actual decision trees for different 
protocols as configured in Therminator.   
 
B. RECOGNIZING ANOMALIES 
As discussed numerous times in previous chapters, the 
visual graphic displays for Zippo are the thermal canyons 
and thermal towers.  Each graph is important for the 
specific details it supplies to the system administrator.   
Numerous Therminator and Zippo experiments have been 
carried out by Graduate students at both the Naval 
Postgraduate School and the University of South Carolina.  
The graphs and discussions presented below are the outcomes 
of these experiments.  They are used here simply to show 
the reader the visual difference between normal network 
traffic and anomalous network traffic.  Additionally, 
graphs will be shown that depict the differences in 
slidelength and windowlength as discussed previously. 
In Figure 9 below, a thermal canyon is presented from 
reference [MCEATHERM-04].  It shows normal traffic in a 
network.  Figure 10, just below it shows the original 
traffic on the same network, but it introduces one 
anomalous packet to the mix.  The aggravation to the visual 
display is very obvious. 
 
  Figure 9. [After MCEATHERM-04] Normal traffic in a 
network.  This is a Therminator display of 200,000 packets 
sent to known web servers. 
  
  
Figure 10. [After MCEATHERM-04] Same network, same 
200,000 packets with the introduction of one anomalous 
packet.  
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Comparing the graphs in Figures 9 and 10, it becomes 
quite obvious that a traffic anomaly has taken place in 
this network.  The variables in Zippo must be configured 
correctly for malicious traffic to be so flagrant.  
Figure 11 below shows an example of an ICMP anomaly.  
In this instance, the spike in the graph shows an increased 
amount of ICMP echo requests.   
 
Figure 11. [After DONA-01] Graphic display showing an 
abnormal amount of ICMP traffic. 
 
Figures 12-14 show different attacks applied to a 
network with Zippo installed.  These graphs were taken from 
reference [KAHWAI—04] and represent work she did 
experimenting with using Zippo with distributed sensors.  
Each of the graphs display a different attack with a 
different PID instance defined for each.  The PID instance 
was reflective of the type of packets that could be 
expected for the particular attacks. 
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Figure 12. [After KAHWAI-04] Graphic display of the 
Thermal Canyon in Zippo during a Mailbomb attack.  The PID 
instance reflected in this graphic is for SMTP traffic. 
 
Figure 13. [After KAHWAI-04] Graphic Display of the 
Thermal Canyon in Zippo during a Smurf Attack.  The PID 
instance reflected in this graphic is for ICMP traffic. 
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Figure 14. [After KAHWAI-04] Graphic Display of the 
Thermal Canyon in Zippo during an Apache2 attack.  Since 
this would be used against a web server, the PID instance 
reflected in this graphic is for http traffic. 
 
 
C. DECISION TREES 
The following figures and tables show decision trees 
developed by Cheng Kah Wai in [KAHWAI-04] to represent the 
PID instances of the thermal canyon graphic displays 
presented in Figures 12 – 14 above.  The decision trees are 
developed for specific protocols.  These protocols were 
chosen as they are the protocols used in the attack that 
were used to test the Zippo application.  These are 
presented as a representation of Zippo’s decision trees and 
how they can be configured for three different protocols. 
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The tables that follow each figure explain in greater 
detail what the rule sets are at each node of the decision 
tree.  This clarifies for the reader how a ball travels 
through the branches of a tree and ultimately into the 
buckets.  
There are two important aspects the reader should 
notice in reviewing the decision trees: 
• The configuration of the decision trees is 
not unique beyond what is required to 
configure the protocol. In other words, the 
decision tree looks at what port number is 
used by the application in question and what 
IP address is assigned to the server.  This 
information can be directly taken from the 
security plan 
• The exchange of balls for normal traffic 
will occur primarily on one side of the 
decision tree.  This leaves the other half 
of the tree available to capture balls 
associated with anomalous traffic.  
  
        
 
  Figure 15. [After KAHWAI-04] A decision tree for the 
SMTP PID instance.  This is the tree used in the mailbomb 
attack shown in Figure 12. 
 
Bucket No.  Classification  
0  N.A.  
1  Insider IP address with TCP ports no. 25, 110, 113 or 161  
2  
Insider IP address with TCP port no. lower than 1024, excluding 25, 
110, 113 and 161.  
3  Insider IP address that does not have TCP port no. lower than 1024.  
4  N.A.  
5  Outsider IP address with TCP ports no. 25, 110, 113 or 161.  
6  
Outsider IP address with TCP port no. lower than 1024, excluding 25, 
110, 113 and 161.  
7  Outsider IP address that does not have TCP port no. lower than 1024.  
Table 3. [After KAHWAI-04] Description of bucket 
definitions for SMTP PID instance in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 16. [After KAHWAI-04] A decision tree for the 
ICMP PID instance.  This is the tree used in the Smurf 
attack shown in Figure 13. 
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Bucket No.  Classification  
0  Insider IP address with ICMP type 3, 4, 5, 11 or 12.  
1  Insider IP address with ICMP type 8 or 17.  
2  Insider IP address with ICMP type 0 or 18.  
3  Outsider IP address with ICMP type 3, 4, 5, 11 or 12.  
4  Outsider IP address with ICMP type 8 or 17.  
5  Outsider IP address with ICMP type 0 or 18.  
6  
Insider IP address that does not have ICMP type 0, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 
17 or 18.  
7  
Outsider IP address that does not have ICMP type 0, 3, 4, 5, 8, 11, 12, 
17 or 18.  
Table 4. [After KAHWAI-04] Description of bucket 
definitions for ICMP PID instance in Figure 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 17. [After KAHWAI-04] A decision tree for the 
HTTP PID instance.  This is the tree used in the Apache 2 
attack shown in Figure 14. 
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Bucket No.  Classification  
0  N.A  
1  
Insider IP address with TCP port no. lower than 1024, excluding 80 and 
443.  
2  Insider IP address with TCP port no. 80 or 443.  
3  Insider IP address that does not TCP port no. lower than 1024.  
4  N.A  
5  
Outsider IP address with TCP port no. lower than 1024, excluding 80 
and 443.  
6  Outsider IP address with TCP port no. 80 or 443.  
7  Outsider IP address that does not TCP port no. lower than 1024.  
Table 5. [After KAHWAI-04] Description of bucket 
definitions for HTTP PID instance in Figure 17.  
 
 
 
D. SUMMARY 
The graphs, decision trees and tables presented in 
this chapter, were used to introduce the reader to the 
graphical three-dimensional visualization of Zippo’s 
monitoring engine.  The graphs were created by previous 
Master’s students at the Naval Postgraduate School when 
researching the ability of Therminator and Zippo to detect 
anomalous network traffic.  The decision trees and tables 
presented at the end of the chapter are good visual 
representations of what the rule sets logically look like. 
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XI. SUMMARY AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY 
This study’s purpose was to determine a methodology 
for implementing a Patternless Intrusion Detection System 
known as Zippo.  Research and interviews were conducted at 
a Federal Government organization and many of their ideas 
and network concerns were presented in this study. 
To effectively implement Zippo, it is important for 
the system administrator to understand how it works.  
Chapter II was a brief review of the TCP and IP protocols 
which are necessary to understand for proper configuration 
of the decision trees in Zippo. Although system 
administrators are probably well aware of how these 
protocols work, this chapter was written to explain the 
basics to any reader of the thesis. 
Along with understanding the building blocks of 
network communication, it is also important to have a 
general overview of the evolution of Zippo.  This started 
in Chapter III with an introduction to Intrusion Detection 
Systems including the different configurations and 
different types of rule-bases, to include signature-based, 
anomaly-based and the latest, patternless based on 
statistical analysis and thermodynamics principles.  This 
is the basis for Therminator. 
Therminator, the predecessor of Zippo, was presented 
in Chapter IV to explain how the Patternless Intrusion 
Detection System works.  It goes into great detail of the 
key components of the PIDS, including the core component, 
the sensors, the bucket and ball decision trees and the 
visual graphic representation of the network traffic.  
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Without a basic understanding of Therminator and 
patternless intrusion detection, it would be difficult for 
the reader to understand how Zippo evolved. 
Zippo, the Intrusion Detection System which is the 
focus of this study was presented in Chapter V.  Here, the 
differences between Therminator and Zippo were compared and 
the improvements and changes that Zippo implemented were 
presented.  To conclude the chapter, the architecture of 
Zippo and the process of implementing it in a network were 
discussed. 
Chapters VI – VIII departed from the Zippo topic and 
focused on the assets that should be in place in an 
organization that wants to implement an Intrusion Detection 
System.  These chapters focus on administrative as well as 
operational aspects of a network.  The necessary documents 
suggested in these chapters were based on experience and 
research with other organizations.  In order to protect a 
network, a system administrator must know what a network is 
made of and what it is doing.  These aspects of a network 
can be found in a thoroughly developed network topology and 
inventory and a well-written and adhered to security plan.  
Having detailed documents in place at an organization and 
having the policies and procedures adhered to are 
invaluable to a system administrator trying to secure a 
network. 
Chapters IX and X presented a more detailed look at 
Zippo.  Chapter IX went into great detail of how to develop 
a decision tree and how to determine the rule sets for the 
nodes.  In this study, a set list of standards to create a 
decision tree could not be developed as was originally 
desired.  There are too many factors in any one network 
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that determine the optimal configuration of the decision 
tree.  Trying to create a template for any network has 
proven to be too weighty.  Therefore, information is 
provided in Chapter IX to assist the system administrator 
in developing the core components, graphical displays and 
sensors for a general network configuration. 
Chapter X provided examples, from previous Graduate 
students’ thesis, of thermal canyons and decision trees 
created to detect specific attacks.  The decision trees in 
the second half of the chapter are a good reference when 
configuring a decision tree for the specific protocols 
mentioned.  This chapter was included to assist the reader 
in visualizing what Zippo is capable of.  
Overall, the objective of the thesis research was met.  
However, the original desire to create a template for any 
given network for the decision trees in Zippo, proved too 
difficult considering all the factors that influence the 
configuration and protection of a network.   
 
B. FUTURE WORK 
Future work for Zippo should include research into 
developing, protocol by protocol, instance by instance, 
optimal decision trees for different purposes.  Perhaps 
optimal decision trees can be created for well-known 
attacks.   
Additionally, Zippo can be researched further on 
robust networks.  In the short amount of time the author 
has worked with the program it seems to provide a very 
capable security application to assist a system 
administrator in successfully securing his network. 
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